This paper describes the sectoral patterns of foreign direct investment in France, Italy and Spain, using a novel data-set on manufacturing firms for the 1993-97 period. Significant heterogeneities emerge across countries in terms of weight and distribution of foreign presence, and in terms of productivity levels of multinational firms. It is shown that such structural diversities can help explain the different impact of foreign owned activities on labour productivity of domestic firms in these countries. Based on this evidence some critical considerations are made on both the "catching up" hypothesis, which identifies a positive relation between the size of technological gaps and growth opportunities induced by foreign investments; and the "technological accumulation" hypothesis, which stresses the role of domestic absorptive capacity and of coherence between foreign and domestic technology as determinants of virtuous effects of inward investments. Policy implications are drawn, concerning the selection and promotion of inward investments in advanced countries.
1.

Introduction
This paper describes sectoral patterns of inward investments in France, Italy, and Spain, and analyses how these patterns affect the productivity of domestic firms. We utilise a combination of firm level data-sets which allows to compare the effects of multinational presence across different countries over the 1993-97 period. The characteristics and comparability of the available data permit us to overcome one of the most recurrent limits of previous studies based on micro-data, which were typically focused on single host economies, and were thus unable to highlight country specific effects of inward investments. Descriptive statistics discussed in this paper highlight that inward investments tend to be associated with different productivity levels of domestic firms across countries. This is consistent with a view of multinational firm spillovers as a function of different structural characteristics of host economies. To a first glance, effects appear to be positive for all industries in France; positive, but polarised around a few industries, in the case of Italy; and roughly negative, if any, in the case of Spain. Going into a more detailed analysis, we focus on two structural characteristics which we deem should affect spillovers from multinational presence in these countries. First, the productivity level of multinational firms, as a determinant of potential technology transfer to domestic firms; second, the innovativeness of domestic firms, as an indicator of absorptive capacity and of the ability to capture the advantages, and to contrast the competitive challenges, stemming from foreign presence. It is shown that both high technological levels of multinationals and high innovativeness of domestic firms lead to a positive impact of inward investments in the case of the examined countries. This suggests that useful insights can derive from the combination of two different, but complementary, interpretive views. On the one hand, the "catching up" hypothesis (Findlay 1978, Wang and Blomstrom 1992) , which identifies a positive relation between the size of technological gaps and growth opportunities induced by foreign investments; and the "technological accumulation" hypothesis (Cantwell 1989) , which stresses the role of domestic absorptive capacity and of coherence between foreign and indigenous technology (Kokko 1994) as determinants of virtuous effects of inward investments. In fact, it will be suggested that, once the discussion on the impact of foreign presence shifts from LDCs to more advanced countries as recipient of direct investments, it is more likely that domestic firms are close to, or even beyond, the foreign technological frontier. A mere consideration of technological gaps may then be misleading, and the actual technological level of foreign firms must be controlled for. By the same token, one should consider that absorptive capacity plays a key role also in the case of Developed Countries, especially when complex technologies are dealt with. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the theoretical and empirical literature background to this paper. Section 3 identifies the issues to be discussed and hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 4 describes our data-sources and shows the results of descriptive statistics on the examined phenomena. Section 5 concludes the paper and draws some policy implications.
2.
A brief review of the literature on the impact of inward investments
Foreign direct investments by multinational firms have grown significantly faster than trade flows among the most developed countries over the past two decades. This process raises concerns about the role that multinationals play for host countries development and performances. Economic literature has identified both positive and negative effects of multinational presence on recipient economies. On the one hand, MNEs may positively affect local productivity by training workers and managers who may move or spin off from foreign owned firms and become available to domestic enterprises (Fosfuri et al. 2001) ; by demonstrating the feasibility of new technology, providing technical assistance, transferring patented knowledge, and generating opportunities for imitation of technological, organisational and managerial practices (Mansfield and Romeo 1980, Dunning 1993) ; by creating demand for local inputs, increasing the specialisation and efficiency of upstream and downstream activities and generating positive externalities for local industries (Hirschman 1958; Rodiguez-Clare, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1999) ; and by exerting competitive pressures to improve the static and dynamic efficiency of domestic firms (Caves 1974 , Cantwell 1989 ). On the other hand, foreign presence may negatively affect productivity of local firms, particularly in the short run, to the extent that MNEs can monopolise markets and draw demand from domestic firms, causing them to cut production and reduce their efficiency (Aitken and Harrison 1999) . Multinationals can also substitute local suppliers with foreign ones, disrupting existing linkages (Lall 1978) .
Whether the overall impact is negative or positive for host economies depends, by and large, on which of these tensions prevails. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) suggests that net linkage creation effects will be (positively) affected by the variety of intermediate inputs multinational firms can gain access to in local markets, as compared to their home market. It has also been argued that local capabilities and technical competencies spur multinational firms to interact with local partners, while they increase indigenous firms' availability and ability to enter collaborations with foreign firms (Dunning 1958 , Cantwell 1989 . Besides, anti-competitive and market stealing effects may be particularly high when inward investments take the form of acquisitions (UNCTAD 2000) .
Empirical evidence concerning the overall effects of multinational growth on recipient countries is mixed. Using cross-country regressions Borensztein et al. (1995) show that FDI from developed countries stimulated domestic investment in LDCs, while UNCTAD (1999) reports that crowding in and crowding out effects of foreign investments tend to cancel out. Using cross-sector data, a number of studies have reported a positive impact of sectoral FDI on productivity (Caves, 1974 , Globerman, 1979 , Blomstrom, 1989 , Imbriani and Reganati, 1997 , 1999 . More recently, using firm-level longitudinal data with specific reference to a few developing countries, one rather robust result is that domestic firms with some foreign ownership exhibit better performance, such as higher productivity and wages, than purely domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1995; Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999) . The hypothesis that multinational firms can act as export catalysts has also received some support (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997) , while the effects of FDIs on domestic firms'productivity often turn out to be not significant, or even negative, when controlling for fixed industry level characteristics (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1995; Haddad and Harrison, 1993) . One exception is Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) who find evidence of significant economic benefits to domestic firms from sector FDI, but the degree of foreign ownership does not affect the extent of these benefits.
As far as the analysis of mechanisms underlying the positive or negative effects of multinational firms, the evidence is even less conclusive, and this is mainly due to lack of appropriate data. Using country level time series and panel data for a sample of OECD and non-OECD countries, De Mello (1999) finds that the extent to which FDIs are growth enhancing depends on the complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic investment. A few studies based on firm level data have produced some evidence on the creation of linkages as a result of multinational presence (Dunning 1993 , Blomstrom and Kokko 1998 , Castellani and Zanfei 2001a . However, the actual transmission from linkage creation to productivity and growth of domestic firms is not clearly documented. With reference to Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that the negative overall effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic firms is by and large determined by a contraction of domestic output, which they interpret in terms of a market stealing effect.
One oft-cited condition favouring a positive impact of inward investments on domestic firms' productivity has to do with the role of technological gaps between foreign and domestic firms. On the one hand, some works put forward the idea that the larger the productivity gap between host country firms and foreign-owned firms, the larger the potential for technology transfer to the former. We label this view as the "catching up hypothesis" (Findlay, 1978; Caves and Barton, 1990) . Consistently with this hypothesis, Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) find evidence that the growth of gross output per employee of locally owned firms in Mexico in 1970-75, is positively related to a measure of FDIs and of initial labour productivity gap between locals and multinationals. In a similar vein, Driffield (2001) shows that changes in value added per employee in the foreign sector, over 1986-89, positively affect productivity growth of domestic firms in the UK, and interpret this as evidence of catching up of local manufacturers stimulated by higher level competitors. On the other hand, scholar have argued that the lower is the technological gap between domestic and foreign firms, the higher is the relative absorptive capacity of the former, the higher are the expected benefits in terms of technology transfer to domestic firms. We label this as the "technological accumulation hypothesis" (Cantwell, 1989) . The analysis of the responses of local firms to the entry and presence of US multinationals in European markets over 1955-75 seems to suggest that the most positive impact occurs in industries where the technological gap is small (Cantwell, 1989) . This is consistent with the view that relatively low technological differentials between domestic and foreign firms would grant higher ability of local economies to capture technological opportunities and to respond to the stimuli created by MNEs. Kokko (1994) focuses on 156 industries that hosted MNEs in Mexico in 1970 and finds evidence that in industries characterised by both large technological gaps and large foreign market shares, which he identifies as "enclave sectors", local productivity growth is significantly inhibited. His idea is that in such circumstances, MNEs are able to crowd out local competitors from the most important market segments, thus reducing the likelihood that positive benefits accrue to, and are captured by, local firms. In a more recent work on Uruguayan manufacturing plants Kokko, Tansini and Zejan (1996) find positive and statistically significant spillover effect only in the sub-sample of locally-owned plants with moderate technology gaps vis-à-vis foreign firms. They argue that small or moderate gap, in the case of Uruguayan plants, identify cases where foreign technologies are useful to local firms and where local firms possess the skills needed to apply or learn foreign technologies. On the contrary, large gaps may signal that foreign technologies are too different from local ones that local firms have nothing to learn, or that local firms are so weak that they are not able to learn. Imbriani and Reganati (1997) , analysing the Italian manufacturing industry, find that value added of domestic firms in sectors where the productivity gap between local and foreign firms is high is negatively related to foreign presence, while the opposite occurs where productivity gaps are low. Preliminary evidence from Portuguese sectoral data supports the idea that positive effects from foreign presence might be associated with intermediate productivity gaps (Flores et al., 2001 ).
To complete this brief review on the role of technological gaps, one should also mention the puzzling results obtained by Sjoholm (1997) . Using detailed micro data from the Indonesian manufacturing sector in 1980 and 1991, he finds that the effects of labour productivity differences (after controlling for capital intensities and scale of production) vary according to the specification he adopts, so that no clear conclusion can be drawn on this issue.
Methodology and hypotheses
Two issues are opened up by the reviewed literature and are worth some further empirical examination. First, it is apparent that the results of the examined studies cannot be easily compared due to the heterogeneity of data sources available, let alone the different methodologies adopted. Data heterogeneity is even more binding when the analysis is conducted at the firm-level, a problem which has often discouraged scholars from using micro-data for cross-country studies. Therefore, using a uniform set of firm-level data to examine these phenomena across different countries will per se imply a considerable advancement.
The second issue to be discussed before entering a detailed empirical analysis concerns the role of productivity gaps in the generation of externalities from inward investments. Most studies addressing this issue focus on LDCs as recipient countries. When the attention shifts to more advanced countries, the analytical framework must be modified from at least two points of view. On the one hand, one cannot presume that MNEs always represent the technological frontier as opposed to domestic firms lagging behind. When dealing with foreign investments directed towards developed countries, like the ones considered in this paper, technological gaps can thus be expected to be significantly lower, on average, than in the case of LDCs, with domestic firms often representing the most advanced ones in the market. Therefore, assessing the role of technology gaps as a determinant of FDI spillovers will not be possible without considering which of the firms -the foreign or the domestic one -is "stronger" in terms of productivity.
On the other hand, given the higher technological proximity between foreign and domestic firms active in Developed Countries (as opposed to the case of LDCs), competitive threats can be expected to be higher. Appropriation of rents stemming from high and increasing productivity thus appears to be more sensitive an issue in these markets. Furthermore, while the degree of "appropriateness" of foreign technology, as constraints to innovation adoption and diffusion, is much less binding in the case Developed Countries (again, relative to LDCs), absorptive capacity remains a key issue here. In fact, to the extent that complex technologies are dealt with, the recipient firm's innovativeness is of paramount importance, as an indicator of its ability to handle and utilise new knowledge; and of its capacity to contrast competitive challenges from foreign firms.
The overall implication is that both high productivity levels of foreign firms (which is the factor stressed by the catching up hypothesis) and high innovative capabilities of domestic firms (which is the condition emphasised by the "technological accumulation hypothesis") should be kept into account in order to capture the effects of FDIs on domestic firms. At the risk of drawing an over-simplified picture, we could identify two basic, opposite cases. The first one is characterised by both Medium-High domestic technological capabilities and High Foreign Productivity Level. Under this circumstance, we may expect an overall positive impact of FDIs on domestic firm performances. In fact, High Foreign Productivity will ensure a considerable potential for technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms; while relatively innovative capacity of domestic firms will guarantee local firms that they have a sufficient absorptive capacity and ability to contrast foreign competitive, market stealing pressures 1 . The second, and opposite, case would be one characterised by Low domestic innovativeness and Low Foreign Productivity Level. Under this circumstance, we can expect that FDIs will have an overall negative impact on local performances. In fact, Low Foreign Productivity implies that MNEs will have relatively little technology to supply to domestic firms: domestic firms' technology turns out to be more attractive for foreign firms, than viceversa, thus opening up take-over opportunities in the host market. Low domestic innovativeness entails that, on the one hand MNEs will have little to learn from local counterparts, and will hence have little incentives to transfer technology; on the other hand, local firms will have little capacity to absorb knowledge transferred from foreign firms if any.
Data sources and descriptive statistics
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of manufacturing firms active in France, Italy and Spain. The sample is the result of the intersection of two commercially available databases, Amadeus and Who Owns Whom 2 . From the former source we obtained most economic and financial data used for our analysis, while from the latter we gathered information on the ownership structure (domestic vs. foreign) of each firm. The overall sample contains 4,514 firms, out of which 2,121 are located in France, 1,226 are located in Italy and 1,167 are located in Spain. Foreign firms represent slightly less than one quarter of total firms in Italy, and between 35 and 40% in the other two countries (see Table 1 for the sectoral distribution of the sample firms). A chi-squared test rejects the hypothesis that the sectoral distribution firms in each country which we extracted from our database is significantly different from the distribution of the population of firms with more than 50 employees, as registered by different official sources of industrial statistics (Eurostat, and ISTAT) 3 . For every firm located in the 3 countries we were able to identify the ultimate parent company, and with this information we have distinguished foreign-owned firms (when the ultimate parent company is different from the country of registration) from domestic firms. Economic and financial data were available for a 5-year time span, from 1993 to 1997. For the purposes of this paper we aggregated firm level data according to ISIC classification criteria, to obtain comparable information at the sectoral level 4 . All data used for the descriptive statistics shown in this paper are drawn from this combined data-set, unless otherwise specified. Table 2 provides an overall picture of the extent of foreign based activities in the examined countries. Foreign presence is measured by the average 1993-1997 number of workers employed by foreign-owned firms (in the sample) whose core business was in a given sector, divided by the total number of workers in the same sector. While the absolute size of foreign activities appears to be highest in France, once we express foreign presence relative to total employment, Spain turns out to have the largest shares (over 50% of total employment on average). Italy is characterised by the lowest multinational presence by all means. Sectoral patterns reflect the characteristics of these countries' economies, although the picture includes firms over 50 employees only. The exclusion of smaller firm sizes may yield a relatively biased picture particularly for Italy and Spain, whose market size is highly fragmented. It remains that, in Italy, the share of total employment represented by foreign activities is particularly high in some traditional sectors, like food and beverages; but it is also high in some high technology industries, such as Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals; in Spain foreign presence concentrates in such industries as Rubber and plastics and non electrical machinery, although it is on average high in several other industries; in France foreign presence appears to be rather evenly distributed across industries, with less remarkable exceptions. Table 2 allows us to compare also labour productivity levels of foreign and domestic firms (expressed in thousands of US Dollars at constant 1995 prices), thus moving a step forward in the direction discussed in section 3 of this paper. On average, France appears to have the highest productivity levels of both domestic and foreign firms, Spain the lowest levels of both, and Italy is located somewhere in between. However, while domestic and foreign firms appear to have a similar productivity level in France (and also in Spain at the lower bound), the level of foreign firms is much higher than the domestic one in Italy. There certainly are significant differences across industries (see table 2 ). However, we have here a stylised fact that markedly characterises the three countries in the terms of our analytical framework illustrated in section 3: Spain, having the lowest productivity multinationals and the least productive domestic firms, appears to have the lowest possibility to gain access to, and take advantage of foreign technology; while France and Italy seem to be better off, although they are apparently endowed with different productivity levels of domestic firms (on average they are higher for France than for Italy). Of course, it would be misleading to infer a one to one correspondence between labour productivity patterns and innovative capabilities of both foreign and domestic firms. However, combining sectoral patterns of productivity calculated from our dataset with the share of innovative firms in the same sectors, as derived from 1996 Community Innovation Survey, we find a rather neat correlation between the two (see table 3 ). Unfortunately, it was not possible to distinguish between domestic and foreign firms' innovativeness; nevertheless, one may assume that some correspondence between labour productivity levels and innovative capacity does exist in the examined countries. Table 4 illustrates this correspondence in some more sectoral details.
We are now able to combine different results of the empirical analysis briefly illustrated above. One way to proceed is to, first, find out to what extent domestic levels of productivity are associated with the degree of foreign presence across sectors in the three countries; second, check whether, and to what extent, the level of foreign firm productivity affects this correlation; and, third, whether, and to what extent, the degree of innovativeness of sectors in which foreign firms are active, affects the relation between foreign presence and domestic productivity. With reference to the first step of this analysis, i.e. testing the correlation between foreign presence and domestic productivity, it appears from table 5 that there exists a significant diversity across countries in this respect. Although the analysis carried out in this paper does not allow to control for all sources of heterogeneity which may affect this correlation (see Castellani and Zanfei 2001b for a different methodology), it does appear that foreign presence is positively associated with domestic productivity in the case of France. It is less clearly so in the case of Italy -wherein we observe a polarised picture with groups of sectors characterised by both low foreign presence, and low productivity of domestic firms (as in the case of transport equipment); and other groups of sectors characterised by much higher foreign presence and high domestic productivity (as in the case of food industry). Finally we observe a negative correlation between foreign presence and domestic productivity in the case of Spain, which is particularly evident for value of foreign presence higher than 50%. This stylised picture is not fully satisfactory, however. We should try and take into account the structural factors characterising the three countries and see how they affect the relationship between foreign presence and domestic performance. The first such structural characteristic examined in this paper is the productivity level of foreign firms active in these countries. Table 6 shows a rather clear cut difference between the high foreign productivity case, and the low foreign productivity case. In the former circumstance, the relationship between foreign presence and domestic productivity is clearly positive (a group of observations concerning Spanish metalworking industries are the only outliers in this correlation). The opposite occurs in the presence of low productivity foreign firms, wherein the relationship is negative. This finding is consistent with the view we discussed in section 3: high foreign productivity is most likely to be associated with greater potentials of technology transfer, which may eventually be captured by domestic firms and positively affect their own productivity. To complete the picture, one would need to control for domestic firms' absorptive capacity, as a key factor enabling host countries to actually capture the potential advantages stemming from high level foreign presence. Firms' degree of innovativeness, as measured by CIS for 1996 would make a good proxy of this absorptive capacity. However, we have two problems here. First, the available data do not allow, at present, to distinguish between foreign and domestic firms' innovativeness. We can only have access to sectoral patterns of innovativeness for the three countries, and this corresponds to a major drawback for our analysis. Second, the overall degree of innovativeness of industries is certainly affected by the innovative capabilities of foreign firms themselves, and this would bias the relationship we would like to observe. Nevertheless, it is quite instructive to examine differences emerging in the case of highly innovative sectors (defined as the ones in which innovative firms are more than 50% of total firms) 5 , as opposed to the case of low innovation sectors. Table 7 illustrates how the relationship between foreign presence and domestic productivity changes according to these circumstances. When considering highly innovative sectors, the foreign presence-domestic productivity relationship is rather clearly positive for all three countries, with France at the upper bound, Spain at the lower bound, and Italy in between. In spite of the drawbacks recalled earlier, this evidence is consistent with the framework discussed in section 3 o f this paper: to the extent that the degree of innovativeness we are able to measure is an imperfect but significant proxy of domestic firms' absorptive capacity, higher innovative local companies should be better off at capturing the potential advantages stemming from foreign presence, and at contrasting competitive challenges in their markets. Table 7 also shows that in the opposite circumstance, i.e. when low innovative sectors are considered, the picture is less clear-cut. In fact we observe that, while the foreign presence-domestic productivity relationship is rather clearly negative in this case for Spain, and even more so for France, the relationship remains positive for Italy. This can have two possible explanations. First, going back to table 4, which shows the sectoral distribution of innovative firms, it appears that according to CIS 1996, Italy has a relatively high average degree of innovativeness, which is confirmed for almost al sectors with few exceptions (hence with a low variance). Thus, Italian firms have rather good innovative performance in spite of the relatively low level of R&D investment that characterises most of its industries, and particularly traditional ones (as in the case of metalworking and non electrical machinery). The implication for our analysis is that "low" innovative firms for Italy are still rather innovative anyways, and this could help explain why spillovers are positive even in these sectors.
To conclude this section, our results support that both high foreign productivity levels (which was emphasised as a key condition in the "catching up hypothesis" discussed in section 3) and high innovativeness of domestic firms (which was stressed by the "Technological accumulation hypothesis" discussed in section 3) can by themselves generate the conditions for a positive effects of FDIs on local firms.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to provide a contribution to the debate on the impact of inward investments, a phenomenon that has been accelerating in Europe since the early 1990's. We innovated on existing literature by providing a wide-spectrum analysis of this aspect of globalisation in three EU countries, using comparable data. We attempted a generalisation of the results obtained for individual countries by controlling for the level of foreign productivity and for the degree of innovativeness of sectors in which multinational companies are active. It was shown that both high levels of foreign productivity and of innovativeness of sectors seem to lead to the most positive effects of inward investments. Based on these results, policy implications are quite different from the usual ones. When dealing with developed economies as recipient countries, as it is the case in this paper, it is not so much a matter of promoting FDIs in industries where technology gaps are low. This might be the case with LDCs as host economies, where governments face the key issues of avoiding the imposition of less appropriate technology. Using the same approach would probably be misleading when considering Developed countries, i.e. economies that are characterised by a relatively high number of firms that are close to the technological frontier. Indeed, these countries are most likely to take advantage from a selection of high level multinationals in sectors wherein they would have a lot to learn, and new foreign technology to adopt. This means promoting the entry of MNEs that are active at the technological frontier, provided that appropriate antitrust and other competition policies are adopted to reduce the risks of monopolisation in these markets. This choice would in fact increase the potential of technology that could be transferred from MNEs to local firms. Of course, policies favouring positive externalities from inward investments cannot be limited to the selection of sectors in which multinational presence should be favoured. A whole set of measures could and should be utilised. Among these a key role is played by measure improving professional training and human capital formation to enhance absorptive capacity and the ability of local firms to utilise external knowledge. Other infrastructural measures, "after-care" policies and the support of local firms, including suppliers of MNEs, would also be beneficial. It remains that investment selection and promotion, especially if combined with complementary pro-competitive and infrastructural policies, should be re-considered in the agenda of national and supra-national governments, as a key tool to enhance industrial growth. Table 7 . Correlations between foreign presence and domestic productivity in sectors with high or low innovativeness, by ISIC sectors, France, Italy and Spain, 1993-97 
